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Abstract
Despite growing scientific interest in the placebo effect and increasing understanding of neurobiological mechanisms, theo-
retical modeling of the placebo response remains poorly developed. The most extensively accepted theories are expectation
and conditioning, involving both conscious and unconscious information processing. However, it is not completely under-
stood how these mechanisms can shape the placebo response. We focus here on neural processes which can account for key
properties of the response to substance intake. It is shown that placebo response can be conceptualized as a reaction of a dis-
tributed neural system within the central nervous system. Such a reaction represents an integrated component of the response
to open substance administration (or to substance intake) and is updated through “unconditioned stimulus (UCS) revaluation
learning”. The analysis leads to a theorem, which proves the existence of two distinct quantities coded within the brain, these
are the expected or prediction outcome and the reactive response. We show that the reactive response is updated automatically
by implicit revaluation lerning, while the expected outcome can also be modulated through conscious information processing.
Conceptualizing the response to substance intake in terms of UCS revaluation learning leads to the theoretical formulation of
a potential neuropharmacological treatment for increasing unlimitedly the effectiveness of a given drug.
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Introduction
What is the neural substrate of placebo response? Are there neurons endowed with a special location or specific neurobi-
ological pathways that are necessary or sufficient for placebo response? Recent approaches have attempted to narrow the
focus, and a major insight from the recent publications is that there seems not be a single neurobiological or psychobiologi-
cal mechanism which is able to explain the placebo effect in general. Instead, different mechanisms exist by which placebo
(and nocebo) responses originate and exert their actions. Here, we pursue a different approach. Instead of arguing whether a
particular neurobiological pathway, mechanisms, or group of neurons contributes to placebo response or not, our strategy is
to characterize the kinds of neural processes (at the system-level) that might account for key properties of the more general
response to substance intake. With this aim we start analyzing the response to (open or overt) pharmacological administration.
Drug administration is said to be open (or overt, opposite to hidden or covert) whenever the administration itself is correctly
perceived by a given subject; so that the individual is conscious of the administration act, and, generally speaking, he/she
might also be aware of the effects that such a substance will determine on the organism (e.g. see [1, 2]). We emphasize three
properties: pharmacological induced response is integrated (the response is given by the integral contribution of different
components, which are the active pharmacological effect, the reactive contribution, due to self-induced response, which, in
turn is governed by UCS revaluation, conditioning and higher cognitive processing, such as beliefs), at the same time it is
highly differentiated (one can experience any of a huge number of different pharmacologically-induced response). Further-
more, a third property is represented by the fact that the reactive response mimics the active pharmacological effect (we denote
this property as reactive mimicking). We first consider neurobiological data indicating that neural processes associated with
drug administration response are integrated and differentiated, and, finally, that a distributed system (denoted reactive system)
mimics the active pharmacological response. We then provide mathematical tools describing the above mentioned properties
of the pharmacological response; this leads us to formulate theoretical and operational criteria for determining whether the
activity of a group of neurons contributes to placebo response and with which intensity. Moreover, the derived model sug-
gests a pharmacological strategy for increase unlimitedly the response to a drug treatment (and hence the drug effectiveness),
exploiting the reactive system dynamics which governs the implicit placebo response.
Methods
General Properties of (Overt) Drug Administration-Induced Response
Generally speaking, the effect of a drug administration is due to the integration of different processes and components which,
together, exert their effect on a given organism.
Integration - Integration is a property shared by every response induced by substance intake, irrespective of its specific
pharmacological target: Each response comprises a single overall effect that cannot be decomposed into independent compo-
nents. More specifically, drug administration, and generally speaking substance consumption, exerts an overall effect wich
is perceived as unique, conveying pharmacological effects, rewarding, expectations, beliefs and prior experiences (e.g., see
[3, 1, 4]). A striking demonstration is given by the decreased effectiveness of hidden treatments. In particular, hidden drug
administrations eliminate the psychosocial (placebo) component, so that only the pharmacodynamic effect of the treatment
(free of any psychological contamination) can be accomplished. More specifically, in the open versus hidden treatments
paradigm [3, 1, 5, 2] drugs are administered through hidden infusions by machines; such infusions can be administered using
computer-controlled infusion pumps that are preprogrammed to deliver drugs at a desidred time. The crucial factor is that the
patients do not know that the drug is being injected. The difference between the responses following the administration of the
overt and covert therapy is the placebo (psychological) component, even though no placebo has been given [1]. Furthermore,
in [3] are reported experimental results which show how the overall response to an analgesic pharmacological treatment is due
to the contribution of 1) prior conditioning, 2) expectations and 3) active pharmacological effect; moreover, the three above
mentioned contributions are indirectly evaluated through the involvement of different treatment groups in double-blind design,
exploiting the open versus hidden paradigm.
Differentiation - While the drug administration response is given by an integral contribution of different components, there
are experimental evidences which show how the mammalian brain can finely discriminate between administration (and/or the
intake) of different substances. For instance, neurons in rats can discriminate between cocaine and liquid rewards [6, 7], or
between cocaine and heroin [8], possibly even better than between natural rewards [9, 10].
At this point it is useful to introduce some definitions. Provided that a given drug administration represents an uncondi-
tioned stimulus (UCS), an active response is defined as the response determined by the active pharmacological effect of the
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UCS within the central nervous system (CNS). Moreover, a reactive response is defined as any response which is determined
by a self-induced reaction within the CNS, without any active pharmacological contribution. For instance, a conditioned
response (CR) induced after some pairings of an active pharmacological UCS and a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) cor-
responds to a reactive response, since the elicited response is not substained by any pharmacological active effect. For this
reason, a reactive response could represent a specific form of placebo. Furthermore, the UCS implicit learning is defined as
the implicit (or automatic) UCS response (UCR) evaluation and re-valuation (i.e., UCR inflation and devaluation or deflation;
e.g., see [11, 12, 13]).
Difference between (pharmacological) conditioning and implicit UCS revaluation. When a neutral CS is paired with an
active drug, the associative learning process is called classical conditioning [14], (for instance when a tone is paired with
the self administration of cocaine in rats; [15]); furthermore, when a drug response (UCR) is evaluated and revaluated over
trials the learning process is represented by UCS revaluation [12]. In other words, from one hand, classical conditioning
learning occurs whenever the CS and the UCS corresponds to different discriminable elements, such that the organism can
learn the simultaneously (or causal) co-occurrence of both elements (in other words the “association” of two distinct elements
is learned) [14]. Instead, on the other hand, in successive trials involving drug administration there is a unique element
(i.e. the drug administration itself, which represents the UCS), which determines an UCR which, in turn, could vary during
successive administration trials; more specifically, if the dose of a drug (i.e. the UCS active stimulation intensity) changes
over successive open administration trials, the organism updates the evaluation of the experienced outcome through UCS
revaluation (for instance, in [11, 13, 16] experiments related to UCR revaluation, independently from classical conditioning,
are reported; furthermore, a quantitative analysis of UCS revaluation and its relation with classical conditioning are derived
in [12]). It is worth noting that, generally speaking, both classical conditioning and UCS revaluation could occur during drug
administration, since the context and other cues could be associated as CSs to the drug administration (UCS).
Finally, a generic induced response within the CNS can be represented by the superposition of the activity of different
neural populations; more specifically, assuming that the CNS consists of N different neuronal populations, the response,
denoted with the vector y, can be expressed as:
y=
N
∑
i=1
yivi, (1)
where yi represents the i-th neuronal population activity1 and {vi; i = 1,2, ...,N} represents a set of versors, being asso-
ciated with different neuronal populations, which form a complete basis B for the CNS space. It is worth noting that the
different neuronal populations could be interdependent (i.e., B does not represent an orthonormal basis), and, the CNS is a
nonlinear system, so that even small variations of the activity (or the elicitation) of a single response component could lead to
a very different outcomes (for instance, a small variation of the mean firing rate of a population, or of the quantity of a given
neurotransmitter, can even lead to an opposite behavioral outcome; [17]).
Reactive mimicking. In a growing body of literature it has been reported that pharmacological conditioning (and im-
plicit UCS revaluation) determines reactive responses which mimic the original active pharmacological effects. For instance,
experimental results reported in [15] show that an increase in dopamine release in the ventral striatum, measured through mi-
crodialysis, are observed not only when rats self administer cocaine (UCS), but also when they are solely presented with a tone
(CS) that has been previously paired with cocaine administration. Furthermore, in [3] it is shown that pharmacological condi-
tioning, like conditioning with opioids, produces placebo analgesia mediated via opioid receptors, and that, if conditioning is
performed with nonopioid drugs, other nonopioid mechanisms are involved, so that conditioning activates the same neuronal
populations as the active pharmacological treatment. Similar results and conclusions have been obtained in mice experiments
[18]. Moreover, brain imaging data, evidence that placebos can mimic the effect of active drugs and activate the same brain
areas; this occurs for placebo-dopamine in Parkinson’s disease [19, 20], for placebo-analgesics [3, 21, 18, 22, 23, 24] or
antidepressants, and for placebo-caffeine in healthy subjects [25]. It is worth noting that since the active pharmacological
response is highly differentiate, the reactive mimicking property leads to the highly differentiation of the reactive system.
Such a system can be thought as a distributed network within the CNS, which generates reactions (or self-made responses) to
relevant stimuli and substances.
The above mentioned properties of pharmacological responding, that are, integration, differentiation and reactive mimick-
ing, can be described from a quantitative perspective; this should lead to the derivation of the laws governing the origin and
1In particular, yi is a real quantity representing the product between the mean number of elicited neurons and their mean firing rates for the i-th neuronal
population (with i = 1,2, ...,N); consequently, yi takes on a positive (negative) value if the response produces an increase of (a decrease or inhibition of) the
activity for the i-th population, and is equal to zero whenever the response does not involve any adjustment for the baseline activity of the population.
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the dynamics of the placebo response. To this aim it is also necessary describing the dynamics of the UCS revaluation, that is
the implicit UCR evaluation over successive administration trials.
Error-Driven Learning
From a growing body of literature emerges that learning occurs through the computation of specific error-signals (or prediction
errors) (see [26, 27] for a review). Generally speaking, the prediction error is defined as the difference between the response
expected from a given stimulation and the response actually perceived by the elicited organism. This definition relies on
experimental observations acquired in functional imaging studies [28, 29, 26], or directly measured in dopaminergic circuits
(e.g., in the ventral tegmental area, VTA) or in other fear-related circuits [30, 31, 32, 33, 10, 27, 34, 35, 36].
Different mathematical models describing classical conditioning learning (e.g., Rescorla-Wagner model [37, 38] or tempo-
ral difference (TD) models [29, 39, 40, 41]), or describing learning in general, such as the probabilistic (Bayesian) “perception”
and “action” learning models (i.e., the predictive coding (PC) [42, 43] and the active inference [44, 45]), assume that coding
behavioral responses involves the computation of an error-signal. More specifically, the brain makes predictions in relation to
a given stimulus and, on the basis of the experienced outcome, the prediction is updated through the prediction error. If the
experienced outcome is greater (lower) than the prediction, the computed error signal is positive (negative) and corrects the
new prediction; furthermore, if the experienced response coincides with the expected outcome, the error signal is zero and no
prediction updatings take place.
Theoretical Concepts and Quantities
Differentiation. Eq. (1) describes the elicited response within the CNS accounting for all the involved neuronal populations
(or response components); however, we can consider one single component to ease the reading. This choice, however, does
not entail any loss of generality, since our model can be applied to any component.
Integration. As previously shown, the response to a drug administration can be expressed by three main contributions
(each of which might be further decomposed in more detail), these are: 1) the active pharmacological response, denoted x;
2) the reactive (self-induced) response due to implicit UCS revaluation learning and classical conditioning, denoted iR; 3) the
reactive response due to expectations and, generally speaking, to higher cognitive information processing (such as beliefs,
social observations and verbal suggestions), denoted γ . Hence, the integration property leads to the following expression for
the general elicited neuronal population:
y = x+ iR + γ. (2)
It is important to note that the above described “response decomposition” is only a theoretical abstraction, since, because
the integration property, the response is unique and the brain cannot discriminate between the different contributions.
Reactive mimicking. Since the reactive response (iR) associated with a given substance determined by implicit UCS
revaluation or by pharmacological conditioning mimics the active pharmacological effect (x), the reactive response for a given
neuronal population can be expressed as:
iR = α · x, (3)
where the term α takes on real values and represents the efficiency (or the strength) of the reactive system for the given
neuronal component.
Implicit UCS revaluation. If multiple successive open drug administration trials are considered, provided that no conscious
information are available (such as verbal suggestions or beliefs) about the drug effects, it can be assumed that in every trial
the expected (or predicted) response coincides with the last experienced outcome (wich, in turn, coincides with the response
experienced in the previous trial), or, alternatively, that the expected response converges over successive trials to the actual
experienced outcome. Without any loss of the generality, we can assume that the predicted outcome is equal to the last
experienced outcome. Provided that the active pharmacological effect (x) is constant over successive drug administration
trials, and that the higher cognitive information processing are avoided (in other words, γ = 0, see Eq.(2)), the reactive
response due to implicit learning (i.e., due to the UCR, or y evaluation and revaluation over trials), iR, is updated through
the error-signal computation. In the first trial the reactive response is equal to zero, since no previous learning occured for
the given drug administration (UCS); hence, y1 = x. Since the expected outcome was equal to zero for that UCS, the error
signal after the first administration trial is equal to x and, such a prediction error updates the reactive response, according
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to Eq. (3). In the second open drug administration trial the response is given by Eq. (2) with γ = 0, that is y2 = x+αx;
moreover, a new error signal is computed as y2− y1 = αx, and the reactive response updated at the end of the second trial is
given by iR2 = αx+α2x. It easy to demonstrate (see Supplemental Information) that the response elicited in the n-th drug
administration trials can be expressed as:
yn = x+ x
n−1
∑
k=1
(
αk
)
. (4)
Eq. (4) shows that the response to a given administration drug diverges (to infinity) or converges to an asymptotic value,
as the number of trials increases, depending on the magnitude of α . The experimental observations (and the ordinary life
experiences) show that the pharmacological responding tends to reach an asymptotic value over successive trials and does not
diverge; hence the absolute value of α has to be comprises between zero and the unity (i.e., 0 < |α|< 1). We denote the above
mathematical condition as stability of the reactive system. Under such a condition it is easy to demonstrate that the asymptotic
response can be expressed as follows:
y∞ = x+ x · α1−α , (5)
where the active pharmacological effect (x) and the reactive component learned during successive trials (i.e., the quantity given
by iR∞ = x · α1−α ), are highlighted. At this stage, if in a successive trial an inerte substance is administered (in other words, if
a placebo is given, so that the active pharmacological effect is brought to zero, x = 0), the placebo response coincides with
the reactive response iR∞, implicitly learned over trials. We argue that such a reactive response represents the unconscious or
implicit placebo response. If the placebo is administered during successive trials, it is easy to demonstrate that the response
tends asymptotically to zero, driven by the error signal (see Supplemental Information). It is important pointing out that
the open administration (UCS) allows the individual to perceive the UCS (i.e., the drug administration itself), and hence to
trigger the learned reactive response associated with that UCS; furthermore, an error signal is computed whenever the UCS
outcome is revaluated. Conversely, if the administration was hidden, no UCS can be perceived and no reactive response can be
triggered. Moreover, it is arguably that different features of the drug administration (or substance intake), such as the flavor of
a given pill (or even conditioned stimulus), contribute to perception and differentiation of the given substance intake (UCS).
Finally, the integration, the reactive mimicking and the stability of the reactive system properties lead to the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. It is necessary that two distinct quantities are encoded within the CNS for the stability of the reactive system,
these are the reactive response and the predicted (expected) outcome.
The demonstration is given on the Supplemental Information. In practice, the theorem proves that both the reactive
response (iR) and the expected (or predicted) outcome have to be computed and independently updated in order to assure the
stability of the reactive system. In other words, the theorem proves that the reactive response cannot be represented by the
predicted (i.e., expected) response.
Outcome Simulation and Conscious Placebo/Nocebo Response
Since the above mentioned theorem proves that both the reactive response and the expected outcome have to be coded
within the CNS, the response to drug administration (more specifically the reactive component of it) should be a function
of these quantities. In the previous Section it is shown how, in the absence of cognitive information processing, the reactive
response by UCS revaluation learning through the computation of the error signal. In this Section it is proposed how it is
possible modulating the reactive response through cognitive and conscious information processing, such as verbal suggestions,
beliefs, expectations, and even by social observational learning [46]. More specifically, we hypothesize that cognitively
processed information, which permits to infer (i.e., to simulate) the outcome of a given substance intake, lead to a process that
we denoted outcome simulation. Such a process consists of high level cognitive processing of different pieces of information
related to the outcome, and lead to the computation of the most probable outcome. Certainly such a computation depends
also on the previous experiences which are evoked by the provided information. If the simulated outcome is different from
the expected outcome (i.e., from the previously experienced outcome) an error signal is computed and the reactive response
(iR) is updated accordingly. From a mathematical and modeling perspective, the outcome simulation process corresponds
to a virtual substance administration trial, in which the experienced outcome is the simulated (predicted or inferred through
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cognitive processing) outcome, and the error signal is computed as the difference between the simulated and the expected. It
easy to prove that the reactive response is updated by the error signal through the following recursive expression [12]:
iR,n = iR,n−1 +α · en, (6)
where en represents the error signal computed in the n-th trial (real or virtual), provided that α does not change over time;
otherwise, the more general expression for iR in the n-th trial is as follows:
iR,n = αn
n−1
∑
k=1
ek. (7)
For these reasons, verbal suggestions or beliefs which let a given individual inferring a positive (negative) outcome, lead
to the computation of a positive (negative) error signal which increase (decrease) the reactive response associated with a given
drug or treatment. We argue that the simulation process takes place not only in drug administration but even in more general
situations, such as in stimulus-outcome learning (or UCS evaluation); for instance animals could learn that a given stimulus is
dangerous observing others facing with such a stimulus [47]. Moreover, cognitive information processing could influence the
reactive response associated with different stimuli and substances; for instance, in [48] is shown, by functional MRI studies,
how prices of wine bottles (which represent here a piece of information related to the outcome) can affect the experienced
pleasantness of the wine intaking (UCS). Indeed, the experienced pleasantness (which represents here the UCR) is due to
the integration of the active component, x, and the reactive (self-induced) response iR, which is due to prior learning and/or
cognitive evaluation. Concluding, cognitive information processing could lead to an outcome simulation process which, in
turn, modulates the reactive response through the computation of an error signal, uderstood as the difference between the
simulated (inferred) outcome and the expected (previously experienced) outcome.
Operational Measures and Prediction of Implicit Placebo Response
Given a specific target neuronal population, the active response to a pharmacological administration (x) could vary across
individuals, and, more important, the reactive response component (i.e., the implicit placebo or reactive response, iR) could be
even more variable. Indeed, the parameter α , which drives the reactive dynamics, should be a function of different parameters,
such as the specific neural population involved (such as dopaminergic, opioidergic, serotonergic, and so on) and the number,
the types and the sensitivity of the receptors within the given population. In turn, these variables depend on different parame-
ters, for instance these are functions of the individual’s genetic makeup. Indeed, there is growing evidence that the individual’s
genetic makeup (a stable trait) influences clinical outcomes and potentially may allow for identification of placebo responders
(see [49] for a review). More specifically, treatment outcomes in the placebo arms of trials that have assessed genetic variation
in the dopaminergic, opioid, cannabinoid, and serotonergic pathways suggest that genetic variation in the synthesis, signaling,
and metabolism of these neurotransmitters contributes to variation in the placebo response [49]. For these reasons, it could be
useful to estimate (i.e., measure) the quantities x and α for a given pharmacological target and for a specific genetic makeup.
With such measures it should be possible to optimize the combination drug-genetic makeup and considering the implicit
placebo response as a stable and reliable contribution of the pharmacological responding and, hence, as an indistinguishable
part of the “true” pharmacological treatment effect. Operationally, the measure of the active pharmacological response can
be assessed by hidden or covert drug administration. The response should be assessed quantitatively adopting, for instance,
functional brain imaging or neurons activity recording, estimating the activity (understood as the product of the mean number
of firing neuron and the mean firing rates) increase of the target neuronal population. Furthermore, the parameter α can be
assessed by open (overt) drug administration, provided that the subject does not know which is the pharmacological target
[3] (in other words the reactive response due to implicit UCS evaluation is considered, and the expectations, beliefs of clin-
ical benefit or higher cognitive information processes are avoided; i.e. γ = 0, see Eq. (2)). More specifically, assessing the
increase of the given neuronal population activity in successive drug administration trials permits to estimate the increase of
the overall response (which comprises the active and the reactive response) which will converge to an asymptote, according to
Eq. (5). Moreover, the asymptotic convergence to zero of the activity of the given neuronal population can be assessed over
successive placebo administration trials. Hence, the parameter α could be reliably estimated from these data through simple
mathematical computations.
Moreover, since an important prediction of the model is the dynamics of the error signals and of the reactive responses
over successive open (active and placebo) administration trials, these quantities can be experimentally measured or estimated.
In particular, experimental measures obtained recording dopamine neurons (e.g., see [39, 50, 10, 27, 34, 36]) reveal that
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dopamine neurons in specific brain regions (such as the ventral tegmental area, VTA, or the substantia nigra) code prediction
and prediction error signals related to rewards (in particular related to rewarding substances, drugs or food delivery). Despite
these experiments were designed to study dopamine neurons activity in classical conditioning and in the unexpected (and
predicted) delivery of rewarding susbstances, these suggest the possibility to monitor the activity of the VTA dopamine
neurons (for instance in rats) during the administration of drugs which determine a rewarding response, such as cocaine
or morphine. In particular, it is expected that in hidden drug administration trials no phasic activity of VTA dopamine neurons
has to be observed; moreover, the same result should be observed during the first open drug administration trial. Furthemore,
starting from the second administration trial, the coding of the reactive response associated with the drug administration
(UCS) has to be observed, and such a response should increase asymptotically over successive trials. Finally, the VTA
dopamine neurons activity should tend asymptotically to zero over successive placebo administration trials. From the above
mentioned experimental measures it is possible to estimate the α parameter for the dopaminergic neuronal population related
to a specific rewarding drug (indeed, different rewarding signals and neuronal populations exist, related to liquid or solid
rewarding substances, drugs, and other rewarding stimuli; [10]). It is worth pointing out that the VTA neurons activity have
to be monitored for all the duration of the drug effect within each trial, since it is arguably that the reactive response mimicks
also the temporal trend of the active drug effect. In fact, in the above mentioned measures performed on the VTA neurons,
time represents a fundamental variable which is coded by neurons (since, for instance, the time of the reward occurence plays
and important role). In other words, it should be possible that, if the active drug effect starts after a time delay from the
administration, and it vanishes with a specific temporal trend, the reactive response could mimick the same temporal trend.
Obtaining Increasing and Resistant-to-Extinction Reactive Responses
Since the mammalian brain is able to induce reactive responses similar to those obtained by pharmacological active effects,
exploiting the implicit reactive system dynamics for obtaining a desired outcome should be feasible, in principle. More
specifically, our system-level model suggests that it could be possible obtaining resistant-to-extinction reactive responses ma-
nipulating the error signal computation. Indeed, even avoiding and neglecting cognitive processing (e.g., verbal suggestions)
during drug administration or substance intake, as previously shown, the error signal is implicitly computed, and it drives (or
updates) the reactive response iR associated with the representation of the given drug (i.e. the UCS; see also [12] for a more
comprehensive analysis). Provided that, for a given genetic makeup and for a specific target CNS component, the reactive
system efficiency α is greater than zero, after some active drug administration trials the reactive response reaches the asymp-
tote iR∞ = x · α1−α (see Eq. (5)) through implicit UCS revaluation learning, and, hence, through the successive updatings of the
reactive response by error signal computations (see Eqs. (6-7)). Furthermore, if a placebo administration trial follows, then
the implicit placebo response, which is equal to the asymptotic value iR∞, is experienced, moreover, the experienced outcome
is updated and an error signal is computed, leading to a decrease of the reactive (placebo) response, which vanishes over
successive placebo trials. However, if the error signal computation is blocked or “degraded” during placebo (or lower active
dose) administration, the experienced outcome is updated; conversely the reactive response (and hence the implicit placebo
response) does not decrease (or decrease by little), since no error signal (or a degraded error signal) updated it. Furthermore,
a resistant-to-extinction reactive response can be obtained, since no error signals can be computed over successive trials, be-
cause the expected outcome concides with the reactive response, which, in turn, coincides with the experienced outcome; in
other words, a reactive response which does not tend asymptotically to zero over successive placebo trials is obtained. We
denote such a response iR0, since it will be elicitated by the reactive system at every substance intake trial (as it were origi-
nally generated by a fictitious trial zero), regardless of whether an active pharmacological effect exists. Indeed, it is easy to
demonstrate that, if a resistant-to-extinction reactive response iR0 has been associated to a given substance, the expression for
the response to substance intake driven through implicit learning in the generic n-th trial is2:
yn = iR0 + x+α (yn−1− iR0) . (8)
The resistant-to-extinction property of a reactive response is the key element for increasing unlimitedly an implicit re-
sponse; indeed, repeating the cycle of trials (i.e., the above described protocol) adopted for obtaining iR0, will lead to the
increase of the reactive response, through an accumulation principle (see Supplemental Information for the computational
details). Hence, through multiple cycles of active pharmacological drug administration followed by inerte (or a lower active
dose) substance administration, together with a pharmacological treatment able to degrade the error signal computation (more
2In [12] it is shown that different resistant-to-extinction emotional reactive responses are natively coded in the mammalian brain from birth, and these are
associated with phylogenetic (i.e., prepared biological and evolutionary fear relevant) stimuli representations [51, 52].
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specifically able to lower the precisions associated with error signals, see [44, 43]), it is possible to “force” the CNS to react
to such a drug with an increasing self-induced response which mimics the active pharmacological treatment. After some
cycles it is expected that the reactive response iR will be greater than the original active pharmacological response, and the
pharmacological effect can be increased indefinitely.
In practice, it is expected that the error signal cannot be completely eliminated in the placebo administration trials, so that
multiple placebo administration trials with an “error signal degradation treatment” will be required, and the resulting iR0 will
be smaller than iR∞. Nevertheless, the proposed implicit learning model describes the reactive system dynamics at a system
(macro) level and, even if it predicts the possibility of obtaining a resistant-to-extinction (i.e., stable) and increasing reactive
response, it does not give any indications of how obtaining it, nor which pharmacological targets have to be considered for
the degradation of the error signal. For these reasons, a specific model, which can describe the error signal computation at a
deeper level (i.e., at the neurons level) is required. We argue such a model could be represented by the so called predictive
coding model (and its version applied to action learning; active inference) [42, 43, 44, 45].
Predictive Coding, Active Inference and Error Signal Computation
In predictive coding [42, 43] is formalized the notion of the Bayesian brain, in which neural representations in the higher levels
of cortical hierarchies generate predictions of representations in lower levels. These top-down predictions are compared with
representations at the lower level to compute a prediction error. The resulting error-signal is passed back up the hierarchy
to update higher representations; this recursive exchange of signals lead to the minimization (ideally the suppression) of
the prediction error at each and every level to provide a hierarchical explanation for sensory inputs that enter at the lowest
(sensory) level. In the Bayesian jargon neuronal activity encodes beliefs or probability distributions over states in the world
that causes sensations [43]. In predictive coding the notion of precision (or confidence, which represents the inverse of the
variance) of the error signals is also formalised, and the mechanism through which the brain has to estimate and encode the
precision associated with the prediction errors is explained. The prediction errors are then weighted with their precision before
being assimilated at a high hierarchical level. More specifically, active inference accounts posit that the brain deals with noisy
prediction errors by decreasing the gain on cortical pyramidal neurons that function like precision units to regulate outputs
from signal error computations, thereby reducing the influence of these outputs [53, 42, 54]. It is important pointing out that
the resulting error signal depends on the relative precision of prediction errors at each level of the neural hierarchy. Hence,
a neuropharmacological alteration of the precision on different levels in the cortical hierarchy could lead to the modulation
of the error signal computation. Furthermore, it is supposed [55, 56] that such an alteration may naturally occur in some
pathologies, such as in Parkinson’s desease, where the depletion of dopamine (which is supposed to encode the precision of
prediction errors by altering their synaptic gain, as also other neurotransmitters do [56]) at different levels, would alter the
balance of precision at higher (sensorimotor) relative to lower (primary sensory) levels in the cortical hierarchy; moreover, the
symptoms vary according to the site (hierarchical level) of changes in precision [55].
Neuronal Populations within the Reactive System
Which are the neuronal populations belonging to the reactive system? In other words, for which CNS response components
does the reactive mimicking property hold? If a given neuronal population belongs to the reactive system, then it is possible to
obtain a reactive response (i.e., an implicit placebo response) for this neuronal population. Experimental results from the liter-
ature evidence that at least the following CNS components could generate a reactive response: 1) emotional system responses
[12] (which include, for instance, the dopaminergic mesolimbic and mesocortical system, [57, 58], the endocannabinoid and
opioid system in placebo analgesia, [21, 23, 59, 24, 60, 61, 62], the serotoninergic system, the target neuronal systems of de-
pression, anxiety and addiction; see [1]); 2) the dopaminergic motor system [19, 20]; 3) the humoral immune response system
(in particular the components of the CNS such as the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, HPA, or the sympathetic nervous
system, SNS; [1, 63, 64, 65]); 4) the endocrine system; (see [1, 66] for a review). We speculate that the main components of
the reactive system are the emotional/motivational and the humoral immune systems, since, from an evolutionary perspective,
the organism has to be able to learn and to automatically react whenever “important” stimuli are perceived, and, implicitly
recognize “relevant” substances, such as food, in order to approach or avoid them or to quickly and automatically react (for
instance through an automatic trigger of a first immune response). More specifically, a stimulus is “important or relevant” for
an organism if it previously elicited a CNS response belonging to the reactive system, such as a painful stimuli (which are
related to emotional components), a rewarding substance (such as food), or primary immune responses.
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Discussion
We propose a model describing response to substance intake based on implicit UCS revauation learning (which describes the
automatic evaluation and revaluation of an unconditioned stimulus, that represents the given substance intake). Such a model
formalizes the key properties of drug administration response based on well established empirical evidence. The theoretical
conceptualization leads to a theorem which proves the necessity of the encoding of two fundamental quantities: the reactive
response and the expected (or predicted) outcome. We have derived a model that meets this requirement and is able to predict
the response to drug administration over successive trials. The placebo response is mathematically formalized as a reactive
response, which represents an implicit and inevitable component of the overall response to substance intake; moreover its
effect becomes naturally evident when an organism responds to a substance administration whose active (pharmacological)
effect has been eliminated.
Modeling the dynamics of the reactive system, from which the placebo response originates, permits also the definition
of quantities (e.g., the reactive efficiency, α) and of operational measures which could lead to the maximization and the
stabilization of the reactive response (iR) for a given genetic makeup, even when the pharmacological active effect (x) is
kept constant. Furthermore, the model shows that it should be possible to create a resistant-to-extinction reactive response
blocking (or degrading) the error signal computation in specific trials. More specifically, after some trials in which the active
drug is administered in order to increase the implicit reactive response, successive trials have to follow, in which placebo
administration is given together with a pharmacological treatment able to degrade the precisions of the error signal (and hence
the overall error signal computation). The targets of such a pharmacological treatment have to be specific neurotransmitters on
precise level of the neural hierarchy, depending on the target component of the original active drug administration; moreover,
predictive coding and active inference model provides the theoretical and computational basis for the assessment of such
targets.
In this manuscript, the theoretical feasibility study of a strategy for the unlimited increase of a given drug effectiveness
has been developed. Further computational and experimental studies are needed in order to explore the mentioned strategy.
We also argue that the generality of our model permits the modeling of a broad range of phenomena and pathologies which
involve the interaction between an organism and a substance intake, such as, drug addictions and eating disorders, and for the
development of novel strategies for decreasing pathological resistant-to-extinction reactive responses, such as in phobias or
post-traumatic stress disorders.
Supplemental Information
In the following sections the equations describing the reactive system dynamics (and, hence, the implicit placebo response
dynamics) are derived. It is assumed that no cognitive information processes occur (in other words, verbal suggestions, beliefs
and expectations on clinical benefit are avoided); however, drug administration, or substance intake, has to be “overt”, so
that the considered individual is aware that the same substance is administered over successive trials (but he/she does not
know which is the pharmacological target of such a substance). Furthermore, to ease the computations, it is assumed that the
expected (predicted) response, in a given k-th trial, coincides with the last experienced outcome (i.e., yexpected,k = yk−1).
Implicit Response Acquisition to a Substance Intake
In this section the responses elicited during succesive trials in which an active drug is administered are derived.
In Table 1 the variables of interest are mathematically described through succesive trials. A single CNS component (i.e.,
a specific target neural population) is considered for the computations, provided that such a component belongs also to the
reactive system.
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Table 1. In this Table the computations leading to the automatic central nervous system (CNS) response to a drug intake over successive trials are
derived. It is assumed that the active pharmacological effect (x) is constant over successive trials.
The response to drug intake in the n-th trial can be written as:
yn = x+ x
n−1
∑
k=1
(
αk
)
(9)
Considering the reactive system stability property, it follows that the term α has to be less than one in magnitude (i.e.
0 < |α|< 1). Hence the summation term in eq. (9) converges to the value α/(1−α), for the property of the geometric series,
when the number of trials tends to infinity. Thus, the asymptotic response due to the active drug administration can be written
as:
y∞ =
x
1−α = x+
α · x
1−α . (10)
The eq. (9) can also be expressed as:
yn = x+α · yn−1 (11)
which shows the recursive nature of the response acquisition process over successive trials.
Reactive or Implicit Placebo Response Dynamics
In this section the response elicited during succesive trials where a placebo is administered (i.e. the active pharmacological
component is absent) is derived.
In Table 2 the variables of interest are mathematically described over succesive trials. A single generic component is
considered in the computations, moreover, it is assumed that the asymptotic response has been reached over the previous
active drug administration trials (see Eq.(5)).
Trial  
number 
Active pharmacological 
response  
Reactive response              CNS response Error signal 
         
 kx    eαii 1k1kR,kR,    kRkk ixy ,  1kkk yye 
xxi
xxi
xxi
xi
xi
nn
nR
R
R
R
R





 11
,
22
3,
2,
1,
0
)1/(
...
)1/(
)1/(
)1/(
)1/(





0
...
0
0
0
3
2
1
0





nx
x
x
x
xx
)1/(
...
)1/(
)1/(
)1/(
)1/(
3
3
2
2
1
0










n
n xy
xy
xy
xy
xy
xe
xe
xe
xe
e
n
n 




1
2
3
2
1
0
...
 0



n
...
3
2
1
0
Table 2. - In this Table the computations leading to the reactive (implicit placebo) response extinction over successive trials are derived. It is assumed
that, previously to placebo admnistration trials, the pharmacological effect was equal to x.
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The response to placebo administration in the n-th trial can be written as:{
yn = α · yn−1
y0 = Y0
, (12)
where, provided that the asymptote had been reached during the previous active pharmacological trials, Y0 = x ·α/(1−α).
Theorem: It is necessary that two distinct quantities are encoded within the CNS for the stability of the reactive system,
these are the reactive response and the predicted (expected) outcome.
Proof. Proof by contradiction (reductio ad absurdum)
Hypothesis 1: The reactive response associated with a given substance intake coincides with the expected (predicted)
outcome, and the expected or predicted outcome converges to the experienced outcome.
Hypotheses 2: The properties integration, reactive mimiking and reactive system stability hold.
Hypotheses 3: Cognitive information processing are avoided (in other words, no beliefs, expectations for clinical benefits,
verbal suggestions and so on, are involved).
Hypothesis 1 asserts that a unique reactive signal predicting the drug administration outcome exists, and that this signal
coincides with the reactive response elicited when the drug is administered; furthermore, the predicting signal converges (by
learning) to the actual experienced elicitation. The last assumption has been formulated to include a more general scenario than
that considered in our initial assumptions, in which the expected outcome coincides with the last experienced outcome. From
a mathematical viewpoint, the expected outcome can be computed using any supervised learning method (or, alternatively,
TD methods [40]) in which the predicted outcome is evaluated on the basis of the past m predictions (i.e., of the predicted
outcomes in the last m trials) and of the actual outcome, minimizing the error between the prediction and the experienced
outcome. Otherwise it can be assumed that the predicted outcome coincides with the last experienced outcome.
1. Let the UCS be the drug administration.
2. Drug administration to a given subject takes place on successive trials, so that it exerts an active elicitation (i.e., it elicits
the active response x). During the first trial the response is exclusively due to the active pharmacological component,
that is y1 = x. After the first trial (for instance, during the drug administration in the second trial), the predicted (reactive)
response, called ypredicted,1, is computed.
3. In the second trial, after the drug administration, the predicted outcome (ypredicted,1) adds up to the successive UCS
active elicitation, so that the outcome can be expressed as y2 = yexpected,1 + x. Furthermore, since ypredicted,1 does not
coincide with the actual experienced outcome, the new prediction ypredicted,2 is computed after the second trial; it can
be easily proved that ypredicted,2 > ypredicted,1 (since the experienced outcome has been strengthened and the error signal
has to be minimized).
4. In the third trial the experienced outcome can be written as y3 = ypredicted,2 + x; since y3 > y2 ≥ ypredicted,2 a new value
for the predicted response is computed, called ypredicted,3, such that ypredicted,3 > ypredicted,2.
5. In the n-th trial the outcome can be expressed as yn = ypredicted,n−1 +x; it is easy to prove that yn > yn−1 ≥ ypredicted,n−1.
Moreover, if the number of trials tends to infinity, the outcome grows indefinitely (i.e., lim
n→∞yn = ∞).
6. The last statement is absurd, as it contradicts Hypothesis 2, in particular it contradicts the stability system principle.
Increasing a Reactive Response through Resistant-To-Extinction Increments
Provided that a resistant-to-extinction reactive response, denoted iR0, has been previously obtained (see Section “Obtaining
Increasing and Resistant-to-Extinction Reactive Response”), it is easy to show that the drug intake response is expressed as:
yn = iR0 + x+α (yn−1− iR0) , (13)
where the term iR0 represents the inextinguishable reactive response obtained during the first protocol cycle. The generic
response at the n-th trial can also be expressed as:
11
yn = iR0 + x+ x
n−1
∑
k=1
αk. (14)
Eqs. (13-14) can be obtained from the computations shown in Tab. 3.
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Table 3. - In this Table the computations leading to the automatic central nervous system (CNS) response to a drug intake over successive trials are
derived. It is assumed that the active pharmacological effect is constant and equal to x, furthermore, a resistant-to-extinction reactive response (iR0)
associated to the given substance intake has been previously obtained, through the strategy described in the previous sections.
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